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I. Introduction 
Health care providers receive lower reimbursements from Medicaid than any 
other type of health insurance.  In 2012, the average Medicaid reimbursement rate 
was only 66 percent of the Medicare rate which is typically lower than the rate from 
commercial insurance plans (Zuckerman and Goin 2012).  The Medicaid rate must 
be accepted as payment-in-full which means that providers receive no additional 
coinsurance payments nor can they extract any additional fees from a Medicaid 
patient even if the reimbursement rate is less than the total cost of care.  As a result, 
health services providers receive less compensation from a Medicaid patient relative 
to a patient with any other form of health coverage and often argue that rates are not 
even enough to cover costs.  In order to subsidize the low rates from Medicaid 
patients, some suggest that hospitals raise prices for privately insured patients to 
subsidize Medicaid patients.  Don George, the President and CEO of Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Vermont wrote that  
 
“When government reimbursements are insufficient to cover the cost of the services a facility 
provides to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries, hospitals charge patients with private 
insurance enough to cover not only the cost of their services, but the shortfall created by 
government reimbursements as well” (George 2014).  
 
Charging higher private rates to make-up for public shortfalls is referred to as cost 
shifting and has been believed by health care administrators to be a key strategy for 
managing low public reimbursement rates.1  A study by the Milliman Institute 
estimated that the cost-shift from public to private patients was a total of $88.8 
billion or 15 percent of all medical costs in 2006/2007 (Fox and Pickering 2008).  In 
                                                          
1 Dennis Vonderfecht, CEO of Mountain States Health Alliance stated that “Existing government 
health care programs such as Medicaid fall short of covering actual health care costs -- meaning the 
company depends on ‘cost-shifting’ to private insurance patients, who pick up more than the cost of 
treatment.” (McCown 2009).  
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this article I focus on dynamic cost-shifting – a phenomenon in which a negative 
exogenous shock to revenue causes an increase in prices for privately insured 
patients. 
Economists have proposed several theoretical models of hospital pricing 
behavior, but they produce conflicting predictions regarding the practice of dynamic 
cost shifting.  A key takeaway from these models is that cost shifting depends on 
whether a hospital acts as a profit maximizer or as a utility maximizer and there is no 
consensus on which behavior is most common to the hospital.2  Given the 
inconclusive nature of the theoretical predictions, it is not surprising that the large 
empirical literature that has sought to estimate the existence and extent of cost 
shifting has produced a broad range of estimates.3   
The goal of this paper is to measure the extent of cost-shifting when 
hospitals are faced with an exogenous reduction in revenues.  This is accomplished 
by exploiting recent Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities that 
reduced the average revenue per patient received by hospitals.  Wagner (2015) 
demonstrated that these Medicaid expansions led to 100 percent crowd-out of 
private health coverage.  Crowd-out occurs when newly eligible individuals with 
private health insurance drop their current health plans in favor of public coverage 
through Medicaid.  Since crowd-out in the disabled Medicaid expansions was 
complete, the take-up of Medicaid by newly eligible individuals was offset by an 
equal reduction in private insurance coverage.  This movement of patients from 
private (generous reimbursement) to Medicaid (less generous reimbursement) 
insurance generates lower revenues per admission and is simply a drop in revenue for 
health care providers.   
                                                          
2 For example, see Sloan et al. (1973), Dranove (1988), Morrisey (1996), Showalter (1997), Clement 
(1997), Zwanziger et al. (2000), Rosenman et al. (2000), and Friesner and Rosenman (2002). 
3 See Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and White (1998), 
Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006), Zwanziger and Bamezai 
(2006), Wu (2010), Stensland et al. (2010), and Frakt (2011) for empirical estimates of cost-shifting. 
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This paper is unique along a number of dimensions.  First, the majority of 
work on hospital cost shifting has used changes to the Medicare program as a source 
of a shock to provider revenues.  Medicaid, however, is a state run program and is 
inherently different from the federally run Medicare program.  Due to their 
differences, health care providers may have greater incentive to cost-shift in response 
to changes in the Medicaid program.  Additionally, the cost-shifting discussion has 
gained steam throughout the implementation of the policies stipulated under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  Given that one of the largest 
pieces of the PPACA is the expansion of the Medicaid programs in several states, 
examining hospital responses to an increase in Medicaid beneficiaries is especially 
relevant.     
Second, most empirical approaches to identify cost shifting behavior have 
relied on changes in the actual public reimbursement rate as the source of shock to 
provider revenue but there are concerns that public reimbursement rates may be 
strategically chosen by the government in response to private prices (Glazer and 
McGuire 2002).  Public and private patients share, to a certain degree, the privileges 
and procedures offered by the hospital even though private patients pay more for 
these services.  If government payers are aware that hospitals will offer these shared 
services so long as private patients will pay for them, they may adjust their rates to 
optimize the benefit from the “commonality” of care public patients have with 
private patients.  Thus, empirical cost shifting estimates using changes in public 
reimbursement rates for identification may be biased by reverse causality.  The shock 
to revenues used in this project more closely resembles the thought experiment 
considered in theoretical work than previous empirical tests of the cost-shifting 
hypothesis since identification is from an average change in revenue per patient 
resulting from crowd-out in disabled Medicaid expansions.  This exogenous event 
likely bypasses concerns of reverse causality that are present when using changes in 
Medicare list charges as I discuss further below.   
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The first step in this project is to verify the existence of the one-for-one shift 
in insurance types within the dataset.  Wagner (2015) used data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the March Current Population Survey 
(CPS) to demonstrate that Medicaid expansions for the disabled generate 100 
percent crowd-out.  In this paper, I use data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
(NIS) of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) from the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality and replicate the basic results of Wagner (2015) 
with hospitalizations.  Using Currie and Gruber’s (1996a and 1996b) measure for 
simulated eligibility, I find that Medicaid coverage for inpatient stays increased by 
roughly the same amount in magnitude as private coverage decreased.  Taken 
together, these results imply that crowd-out within the inpatient setting is complete 
and there is a one-for-one relationship between Medicaid take-up and private 
coverage reduction.  
I find that in response to the shift in insurance types, hospitals reduced the 
average charge rate for privately insured patients, while charge rates for other payer 
types are not statistically significantly different as a result of the insurance shift.  This 
behavior is consistent with a Mixed Economy Model where the hospital acts as a 
profit maximizer (Sloan et al. 1978).  These results are important given that cost-
shifting has been a major concern of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA).  There has been much speculation that the PPACA Medicaid expansions 
ongoing in several states will result in increases of private out-of-pocket medical 
expenses and insurance premiums due to cost-shifting.  The results of this paper 
would suggest otherwise and that instead hospitals will actually reduce charges for 
private insured patients.   
The rest of paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes our current state 
of knowledge of cost-shifting.  Section III outlines the research strategy.  Section IV 
details the data and estimating equations used for the study.  Section V presents the 
results of the paper.  Section VI concludes. 
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II. Conflicting Models and Inconclusiveness: The Ongoing Cost-Shifting Debate 
Cost-shifting occurs when one consumer type is charged a higher price so 
that another type can pay a lesser price relative to costs.  Though this sounds very 
similar to price discrimination, the ideas are really two entirely different notions.  
Both price discriminators and cost shifters require that the supplying firm has some 
market power, but under price discrimination, there does not need to be a direct 
connection between the different prices the discriminator charges the different 
groups.  In contrast, with cost-shifting there is a causal and dynamic connection 
between the different prices charged by cost shifters.  Thus, while cost shifting 
always involves some degree of price discrimination, it is not always the case that 
price discrimination means cost shifting.  
There are two main threads of literature that focus on modeling hospital 
pricing behavior with regards to cost shifting.  Both threads assume that the hospital 
is faced with two types of insurance: a higher priced private market and a lower 
priced public alternative.  This two-market model has been commonly referred to as 
a mixed economy model and was originally discussed in Sloan et al. (1978) as a way 
of modeling physician participation in the Medicaid program.  Using these models, 
we form predictions as to how hospitals respond to a shock in provider revenue, 
usually originating from a change to the public insurance reimbursement rate.   
The first thread of the cost-shifting literature assumes that hospitals behave 
as profit maximizers.  In standard market models, if a hospital is profit maximizing, 
cost-shifting strategies would not be employed.  Profit maximizing firms should have 
already exhausted their market power and further price discrimination is not 
possible, eliminating the ability to cost shift onto private payers (Morrisey 1996).  In 
response to lower public payments, profit maximizing health care providers may 
choose to accept fewer public paying patients (Showalter, 1997).  This would be 
challenging for hospitals since most are legally mandated to admit any patient who 
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arrives requiring care.  Hospitals would like to serve more private patients than 
public patients, however, since they are reimbursed more per private patient.  Thus, 
in order to attract more private patients to use their facility, profit maximizing 
hospitals will lower private prices (Showalter 1997).   The new private price will still 
be higher than the public reimbursement rate.  This is the opposite of what cost-
shifting theory would suggest.   
A prediction from the profit maximization assuming models is that when the 
public reimbursement rate is reduced, the private rate should also decrease.  That is, 
we would expect to see a positive correlation between Medicaid and private 
reimbursement rates.  Time series trends in private and public health prices run 
counter to this prediction, however.  Figure I plots the aggregate hospital payment-
to-cost ratios for private, Medicare, and Medicaid insurance in the United States 
from 1992 to 2012.4  As the private payment-to-cost ratio falls in the late 1990s, the 
public payment-to-cost ratios rise and in the early 2000s when private rates rise again, 
the public rates decline.  The trends documented in Figure I demonstrate a negative 
correlation between private and public hospital payments but this is at best only 
suggestive evidence against the profit maximizing assumption.  
 The second thread of the cost shifting literature does not assume profit 
maximizing behavior and instead focuses on hospitals behaving as utility maximizers.  
A primary motive for this is that only 18 percent of US hospitals in 2011 were 
investor-owned (for-profit) (American Hospital Association 2013).  Not-for-profit 
hospitals typically have no shareholders so any profits generated are used to fund 
hospital operations or projects such as capital improvement or charity care.  Many 
not-for-profit hospitals have mission statements that indicate they seek to meet 
community needs, provide care to as many patients as possible, and advance 
treatment and means of prevention (Ginsburg 2003).  As a result, it is often thought 
                                                          
4 The hospital payment-to-cost ratios are from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch 
Charbook. 
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that not-for-profit hospitals maximize a utility function with profit margin and 
alternative objectives (usually identified within their mission statements) as 
arguments.  
 One of the biggest challenges of the utility maximization approach is 
determining which alternative objectives in addition to profits should be included 
when modeling the hospital’s utility function.  Frakt (2011) provides an excellent 
review of the utility maximizing literature which I will briefly describe below.  Several 
studies assume that there are only two arguments in a hospital’s utility function: 
profits and the total volume of medical services provided to the hospital’s 
community (Dranove 1988; Clement 1997; and Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 
2000).  These studies find that utility maximization models, unlike the profit 
maximizing assuming models, allow for the possibility of cost shifting but do not 
guarantee that cost-shifting will occur.  Other studies assume that utility maximizing 
hospitals care about their overall appearance to the community or their “prestige” 
(Rosenman et al. 2000; and Friesner and Rosenman 2002).  The Rosenman et al. 
(2000) model shows that prestige maximizing hospitals can either cost shift or cost 
cut in response to reductions in public payments.   
 The two threads of literature produce conflicting theoretical predictions.  It is 
clear that while profit maximization suggests the impossibility of cost shifting, utility 
maximization implies that cost shifting may occur.  Given these conflicting 
theoretical results, there have been several empirical attempts to determine whether 
cost shifting exists in the U.S. health care market.  These studies focus not only on 
whether hospitals cost shift, but also to what extent cost shifting occurs.  Provided 
that hospitals shift the burden of the reductions in public payments onto private 
payers, they may do this dollar-for-dollar or at some lower rate.  The majority of the 
empirical literature finds that the extent of cost shifting is far less than dollar-for-
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dollar. 5  Only Cutler (1998) found evidence of dollar-for-dollar cost shifting and this 
was restricted to the 1985-1990 time period.6   
Though a large portion of cost shifting literature was published in the late 
1990s to early 2000s, even more recent empirical cost-shifting articles still produce 
conflicting results.  Wu (2010) finds evidence of cost-shifting in Medicare payment 
reductions stipulated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, though the degree of cost-
shifting is relatively small (only 21 cents per dollar reduction in Medicare revenue 
was shifted onto private payers).  White (2013) constructs private and Medicare 
payment rates at a market level for the years 1995-2009.  Using a “log-log” 
specification, the results from White (2013) indicate that a 10 percent reduction in 
the Medicare rate, led to a 7.73 percent reduction in the private rate.  White’s results 
suggest that hospitals did not pursue cost-shifting, but rather cost-cutting strategies 
to make up for the deficit between private and public rates.  Thus, even the most 
recent empirical estimates still provide mixed results regarding the existence of cost 
shifting in the US health care market. 
One concern with current cost shifting estimates is that it is measured in 
terms of direct changes to the actual public reimbursement rate (usually Medicare) 
and it is possible that these rates are not chosen exogenously.  Once admitted to a 
hospital, patients share to a certain degree in services and amenities the hospital 
offers no matter their insurance type. For example, most hospitals will not have two 
separate MRI machines, one a top-of-the-line model for higher paying private 
patients and the other an old out-of-date model for the government reimbursed 
public patients.  The hospital cafeteria will also not have two separate menus where 
private patients are offered steak and lobster and the public patients are offered 
                                                          
5 Several empirical studies attempt to measure the extent of hospital cost shifting empirically.  Studies 
include Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and White (1998), 
Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006),  Zwanziger and 
Bamezai (2006), Wu (2010), and Stensland et al. (2010). These are effectively summarized in Frakt 
(2011), Table 2. 
6 In the same study, he finds very little evidence of cost shifting from 1990 to 1995 speculating this as 
being a result of increased managed care use during this time period.   
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bologna sandwiches. Thus, when a hospital makes an investment into new 
equipment or amenities, it is likely that both types of patients will benefit to some 
degree and we refer to this phenomenon as the “commonality” of care amongst 
patients.   
If the degree of commonality is substantial between the two types, then 
public patients benefit from the level of care for which private patients pay higher 
prices.  Payment rates set by hospitals for the private market reflect not only the cost 
of the actual treatment for a patient, but also investments into new equipment or 
training, maintenance and upkeep of facilities, and general amenities the hospital 
chooses to offer.  The government is aware of the fact that public patients benefit 
from these investments even though the hospital is not reimbursed at the same rate 
for providing them treatment.  It is possible that the government can strategically set 
the public reimbursement rate (with knowledge of the private rate) with the intent of 
optimizing the degree of commonality between public and private patients (Glazer 
and McGuire 2002).  Thus, the private rates could actually influence the government 
rate setting process which would result in reverse causality in the empirical equation.  
It is therefore a concern that empirical estimates may be biased when a direct change 
in public reimbursement rates is used for identification.  In this paper, my research 
strategy will not use a change in the reimbursement rate for identification and the 
empirical estimates will avoid any reverse causality concerns originating from 
strategic public price setting.     
Another limitation of current cost shifting estimates is that most of them are 
estimated relative to changes in the Medicare program.  The Medicaid program, even 
though it is slightly smaller than the Medicare program, is another important public 
health insurance program in the United States.  In 2012, Medicaid expenditures were 
$421.2 billion which is 25 percent less than total Medicare spending ($572.5 billion) 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014).  Though both programs provide 
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health insurance to their recipients using government funds, Medicaid and Medicare 
are incredibly different programs.   
First, the two programs have different funding and administrative practices.  
Medicare is entirely federally funded with all of its eligibility requirements, 
reimbursement rates, and operating procedures completely determined by the federal 
government.  Medicaid, on the other hand is a state-run program that is dually-
funded by both the state and federal governments.  States are allowed to choose their 
own eligibility requirements, reimbursement rates/policies, and coverage options and 
as long as these selections meet federal minimums, the federal government will 
reimburse at least 50 percent of all Medicaid expenditures.7  Given that states are the 
administrators of their own programs, Medicaid program characteristics can vary 
quite a bit across states whereas Medicare is virtually the same throughout the entire 
country.   
Second, the beneficiaries covered by Medicare and Medicaid are not the 
same.  Medicare covers mostly elderly individuals (65 or older) and those who are 
receiving Social Security Disability Insurance.  Medicaid covers a wide variety of 
populations (women, children, elderly, and disabled) with the foremost eligibility 
requirement being that a recipient must have low income and limited financial 
resources.  The Medicare program has no income restriction to qualify and most of 
its beneficiaries are actually required to pay some type of coinsurance fees.8  The bulk 
of Medicaid policies require no type of copayment for treatment.  Given the diversity 
in their beneficiaries, it is possible that hospitals and health care providers may 
respond differently to changes in the two programs and so it is important to 
                                                          
7 The federal reimbursement rate of Medicaid expenses in each state is called the Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP).  States receive an FMAP of at least 50 percent but no more than 
74.73 percent. States with lower incomes per capita relative to the US income per capita receive higher 
reimbursement rates from the federal government (Baumrucker 2010). 
8 Coinsurance fees for individuals who are dually eligible for both the Medicaid and Medicare 
programs are paid for by their Medicaid program. 
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investigate cost shifting from a Medicaid perspective which is what is pursued in this 
paper. 
Since my estimates for cost-shifting are measured relative to Medicaid crowd-
out (described in the research strategy section below) rather than Medicare rates, it is 
difficult to make a direct comparison to the results from Wu (2010) and White 
(2013) in terms of the magnitude of the effect.  I find, however, that in response to 
the revenue shock, private rates are reduced which more closely aligns with the 
results of White (2013). 
 
III. Research Strategy 
To improve upon earlier work, I employ an alternative method of identifying 
cost shifting that avoids using a change in the reimbursement rate and also measures 
cost-shifting from a Medicaid perspective.  I take advantage of a unique Medicaid 
expansion described in Wagner (2015).  The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 
(OBRA86) gave states the authority to increase Medicaid income eligibility for 
disabled individuals up to 100 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).  Prior to 
this authorization, the majority of disabled individuals had to qualify for Medicaid 
through the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) which had an eligibility 
cutoff of approximately 74 percent of the FPL.  By 2003, 21 states and the District 
of Columbia had enacted the OBRA86 expansion (Herz et al. 2006).   
A major concern with any public health insurance program expansion is the 
potential for crowd-out – when individuals with private insurance gain Medicaid 
eligibility and drop their private coverage in favor of public benefits.  The rate of 
crowd-out has been a key focus of the public health insurance expansion literature 
and crowd-out for children and families has been estimated to be close to 50 
percent.9  Wagner (2015) investigated the degree of crowd-out in the disabled 
                                                          
9 See Aizer and Grogger (2003), Blumberg et al. (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Cutler and 
Gruber (1996), Dubay and Kenney (1996) and (1997), Gruber and Simon (2008), Ham and Shore-
Sheppard (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), Hudson et al. (2005), LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004), 
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Medicaid expansions authorized under the OBRA86.  Using both the March Current 
Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the study 
finds that crowd-out for the disabled population was large.  The 2SLS estimates 
imply that for every individual who took up Medicaid through the eligibility 
expansions another lost their private insurance.10   
Since crowd-out in these expansions was complete, disabled individuals 
shifted from private health insurance (generous reimbursement) to Medicaid 
coverage (less generous reimbursement) with little change to the overall insurance 
rate.  Given this shift, the overall patient pool had less revenue generating capability 
after the expansions, reducing revenue to hospitals without any direct change to the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate itself.  Thus, the degree of crowd-out resulting from 
changes to Medicaid eligibility can be used to identify any changes in hospital pricing 
behavior resulting from the reduction to revenue.  A benefit to this strategy is that 
we avoid the potential for reverse causality that originates from strategic pricing to 
optimize patient commonality of care. 
Figure II presents a graphical representation of predictions of the effect of 
crowd-out on medical prices from the mixed economy model.  In the price setting 
market (private health insurance), health care providers face a downward sloping 
demand curve Demand 1 that corresponds to marginal revenue curve MRP1 and 
have a marginal cost curve MC.  Since the government has complete control over the 
prices paid to providers for treating public patients, the government reimbursed 
market is represented by the horizontal line at a fixed reimbursement rate, Pm.  Prior 
to the public insurance expansion, health care providers face the marginal revenue 
curve ACD and will offer Q amount of medical services at a price of P1.  When 
                                                          
Shore-Sheppard (2008), Thorpe and Florence (1998), and Yazici and Kaestner (2000).  See Hamersma 
and Kim (2013) and Gruber and Simon (2008) for a review of this literature. 
10 These results are thought to indicate a switch from private to public coverage by the individuals 
who take-up Medicaid coverage.  Since the analysis uses cross sectional data from the March CPS and 
the SIPP this cannot be stated conclusively given that the cross sectional data surveys different 
individuals over time.  The results do indicate a compositional change of insurance coverage type for 
individuals who become eligible for Medicaid coverage through the expansion. 
13 
 
 
Medicaid eligibility is expanded and crowd-out occurs, patients will shift from 
insurance carriers in the private market to Medicaid coverage in the government 
reimbursed market.  Since the expansions only affect the eligibility standards, the 
public reimbursement rate, Pm, is not altered and the government market demand 
curve is unaffected by the legislation.  In the private market, the shift in insurance 
type means that MRP1 will rotate to MRP2 (Demand 1 rotates to Demand 2) since 
the number of privately covered patients is reduced (Garthwaite 2012).  A key 
advantage of the Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities is that crowd-
out was essentially complete.  This means that there will be no countervailing effects 
on hospital revenue resulting from the uninsured gaining access to health coverage 
through Medicaid. 11  After the expansion, the hospital now faces a marginal revenue 
curve ABCD and the price for the provider with supply curve MC will decrease from 
P1 to P2.  Thus, the model predicts that the opposite of cost shifting will occur.  That 
is, hospitals will actually lower their prices for privately covered patients. 
There may be a concern that state governments can control the level of 
crowd-out in a public insurance expansion in such a way as to optimize the 
commonality of care between public and private patients.  If governments have this 
ability, then cost-shifting estimates using my research strategy are potentially subject 
to the same biases as those that are measured relative to the public reimbursement 
rate as was the case in earlier literature.  There are several reasons why this is not an 
issue.  Unlike the Medicaid reimbursement rate, states cannot directly set the level of 
crowd-out in a public insurance expansion.  They can only control the eligibility 
levels which indirectly influence the degree of crowd-out.  It is hard to imagine that 
states have great control over the degree of crowd-out purely through eligibility 
levels.  Even further, the OBRA86 expansions only allowed states to select eligibility 
                                                          
11 If the uninsurance rate were to decrease, then this would suggest that some previously uninsured 
individuals gained insurance coverage.  This could result in a positive shock to provider revenue, since 
prior to the expansion hospitals received zero reimbursement from these patients and are now 
receiving at least the Medicaid level of reimbursement. Since the uninsurance rate remains unchanged, 
there is no counterveiling effect on provider revenue and only a revenue reduction. 
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levels below 100 percent of the FPL so they did not have free reign over their 
eligibility standards.   
Another reason I suspect that the strategic selection of crowd-out is not an 
issue in this case is the large magnitude of the crowd-out rate.  Crowd-out is a 
contentious issue in public health insurance expansions drawing much debate and 
criticism. As a result, governments would ideally desire for the level of crowd-out to 
be as close to zero as possible and we would expect any type of state selection to bias 
the rate of crowd-out down. Given that the rate of crowd-out for the Medicaid 
disability expansion was 100 percent (essentially the highest possible level), this 
suggests that states were not strategically capable of selecting the degree of crowd-
out within these expansions. 
 
IV. Data and Estimating Equations 
A. Data 
 The main data source for this project is the Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
(NIS) which is part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) produced 
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  The HCUP NIS contains 
information on discharges from nearly 8 million hospital stays each year in the 
United States that includes patient demographics, hospital identifiers, duration of 
hospital stay, diagnosis codes, total charges, and expected payment source (i.e. 
insurance type).  Weighted, the HCUP NIS represents nearly 35 million hospital 
stays each year (HCUP databases 2009).  Though the HCUP NIS contains a varying 
number of participating states over time, with proper weighting the sample of 
discharges in the dataset is stratified in such a way to be a national representation of 
all inpatient discharges in the United States.  My analysis will use data from the 1995-
2007 HCUP NIS.12 
                                                          
12 The 100% NIS sample is used for the analysis though smaller subsets of the data are available. 
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I impose a number of restrictions to construct my study sample.  The 
Medicaid expansions being examined in this paper only apply to individuals with 
disabilities.  Thus, the main sample only considers discharges where the patient had a 
disability.  For the purposes of this paper, I define disability to be the presence of a 
chronic condition on a patient’s discharge record since chronic disease is the leading 
cause of disability.  I describe in a later section how I determine within the NIS if 
patient has a chronic condition.  Given that most individuals 65 years and over are 
automatically covered by Medicare, I restrict the sample to individuals under 65 years 
old.  I also eliminate women and children (individuals under the age of 20) from the 
sample since Medicaid offers more generous coverage opportunities for these two 
groups.  A person’s race is strongly related to their participation in the Medicaid 
program and I exclude 10 states not reporting this information.  One additional state 
(Wisconsin) was also excluded due to inconsistent charge reporting noted by HCUP 
in their data documentation.  The final sample contains 30 of 41 possible states.  To 
reduce the computational dimension of the problem some, only the top 100 primary 
diagnosis codes are used in the main analysis.  These diagnosis codes account for 57 
percent of all disabled male discharges and 52 percent of all disabled male medical 
charges in the HCUP NIS.   
A unique quality of the HCUP NIS is that it contains data for multiple 
insurance types: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, Self-pay, Charity-care, and Other.  The 
insurance type of “other” contains a wide variety of insurance policies including 
military/veteran’s insurance, workman’s compensation, and state-specific insurance 
pools.  Since the insurance policies contained in this group are so broad, I exclude 
individuals with “other” insurance type from the main sample.13   
Summary statistics for the final sample are presented in Table I.  The final 
sample contains almost 4.9 million male discharges.  Males with private insurance 
                                                          
13 Only 6% of disabled working age male discharges in the HCUP NIS were reported as having 
“other” type of health insurance.  
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account for 49 percent of the sample while Medicaid and Medicare each account for 
19 and 21 percent, respectively.  The remaining discharges are either covered by self-
pay (uninsured) or charity-care from the hospital.  The average charges per discharge 
were $26,279 in real 2007 dollars with an average duration of hospital stay equal to 
5.2 days.  The sample was approximately 70 percent white, 19 percent black, and 9 
percent Hispanic. 
B. Identifying Disability 
 The HCUP NIS does not directly report whether a patient has a disability 
and since the Medicaid expansions being used for identification are only for those 
with disabilities, it is important to utilize an appropriate method of identifying 
disabled individuals within the HCUP NIS.  The definition of disability used for 
Medicaid eligibility determination is the same as the definition used by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) for SSI qualification.  SSA guidelines dictate that an 
adult is considered disabled if she has a “medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment” that prevents “substantial gainful activity” and is expected to “result in 
death” or has “lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 
than 12 months” (Social Security Administration 2012).  This definition is very broad 
and relies heavily on a physician’s judgment.   
In this paper, I will use the presence of a chronic condition as a proxy for 
disability.  Though they are not perfectly correlated with the SSA’s disability 
definition, chronic conditions are the leading cause of disability in the United States 
and are likely strongly related (CDC, 2014).  The most common causes of disability 
over the study period were all prominent chronic conditions (Hootman et al. 2005).  
Using the diagnosis code information from each discharge contained within the NIS, 
I can identify whether an individual has some form of chronic disease.  To do this I 
use the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACG) System which will take the 
diagnosis codes from the discharge record, determine which of these codes are 
considered to be chronic conditions, and then form a count of total chronic 
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conditions on a patient’s record.  I then consider a patient to be disabled if they have 
one or more chronic conditions reported on their diagnosis record.  The top five 
primary diagnosis codes for men with at least one chronic condition on their record 
are reported in Table II.  Most of these conditions are related to heart or lung 
problems which were the most commonly reported forms of disability in the 2005 
Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
C. Measuring Crowd-out 
In order to evaluate the expansion’s effect on the cost shifting behavior of 
hospitals, we need to construct a measure of the shift in insurance type that results 
from crowd-out.  In the public insurance expansion literature that attempts to 
measure crowd-out, authors use data at the individual level to construct dependent 
variables that are dummy variables measuring insurance status such as having 
Medicaid or private insurance.  These insurance status variables are then regressed on 
a dummy variable that measures whether the respondent is eligible for the Medicaid 
program.  Eligibility status in these studies is imputed using reported financial and 
family information and as such likely contains measurement error.  The regression is 
also subject to an omitted variables bias in that there is a mechanical reverse 
correlation between dependent and independent variables since disabilities reduce 
earnings and lower earnings people are more likely to qualify for Medicaid.  To 
correct for both of these issues, the model is estimated with 2SLS using a suitable 
instrument for Medicaid eligibility. 
Wagner (2015) uses the simulated eligibility instrument originally outlined in 
Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) to investigate the crowd-out rate in the 
Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities.  Simulated eligibility uses a 
fixed national population and compares that population to a state’s annual Medicaid 
eligibility rules.  The share of the fixed sample that qualifies for Medicaid under a 
state’s rules represents the simulated instrument.  Thus states with more generous 
Medicaid programs will have higher simulated eligibility.  Wagner (2015) uses this 
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simulated measure to instrument for imputed eligibility and finds that for every 100 
people made eligible through the expansion, nearly 41 took up Medicaid coverage 
while 44 lost private coverage.  Taken together, these results suggest that individuals 
shifted onto public coverage from private coverage at an approximately one-for-one 
rate. 
The data necessary to construct simulated eligibility is the Medicaid 
qualification rules for the disabled from 1995 to 2007 by state.  Disabled individuals 
have multiple routes they can pursue in order to gain Medicaid coverage such as 
poverty related coverage through the OBRA86, the Supplemental Security Income 
Program, or the State Supplemental Payment Program.  During the study period, 
poverty related coverage is experiencing the most changes and most of the variation 
is derived from this pathway.  Taking into account the eligibility rules of all these 
different avenues, I construct an upper income limit – the maximum amount of 
income an individual with a disability is allowed to possess and still qualify for 
Medicaid coverage under one of the programs.14  Table III contains the upper 
income limits for states in the sample in their first year of reporting to the HCUP 
NIS and the last year of the sample period (2007).  These upper income limits 
demonstrate that there is quite a bit of variation in Medicaid eligibility rules across 
states and time.    
Following the strategy employed in Wagner (2015), I use the March Current 
Population Surveys from 1996 to 2008 and restrict the sample to men between the 
ages of 20 and 64 who report having a work limiting disability.15  Using this sample, 
                                                          
14 These rules were compiled from published sources following strategies described in Brown et al. 
(2007) and Coe (2005). The specific sources used to construct the upper income threshold of 
Medicaid eligibility rules for the aged and disabled were Brown et al. (2007) , Bruen, Wiener, and 
Thomas (2003), Bruen, Wiener, Kim, and Miazad (1999), Coe (2005) , Congressional Research Service 
(1993), De Nardi et al. (2011), Horvath (1997), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 
(2010), Kassner (2000), Mississippi Division of Medicaid (1991-2008), Social Security Administration 
(1991-2008), Stone (2002, 2011), and state Medicaid websites.  
15 Wagner (2015)’s primary analysis relied on data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) which is a monthly level household survey, but found similar results using the 
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the simulated eligibility measure is constructed as the percentage of disabled men 
that would be eligible for Medicaid coverage under each state’s eligibility rules by 
year.  These percentages are then matched by state and year to the HCUP NIS.  The 
simulated instrument is a measure of Medicaid generosity by state and year that 
reflects variation in the legislative changes in eligibility rules and not changes in the 
characteristics of a state’s population.  Simulated eligibility acts as a measure of how 
likely crowd-out is to occur and we can use simulated eligibility as a measurement of 
a shock to provider revenue.  The simulated eligibility levels for a state in their first 
and last year of the sample are displayed in Table III along with the corresponding 
upper income limits that generated them.   
The variation in the instrument is generated by changes in state legislation 
concerning Medicaid eligibility rather than individual characteristics of a state and its 
residents.  For this measure to provide consistent estimates it must be the case that 
the changes in the legislation are exogenous.  This observation is consistent with the 
assumption that states experiencing increased eligibility in their Medicaid rules did 
not have different trends in coverage rates compared to states with static eligibility 
rules over the same period.  Using disabled working age individuals from the March 
CPS 1992 to 2008, I test whether there is a difference in pre-treatment trends in 
insurance coverage between reform and non-reform states.16 The key outcomes are a 
set of measures of coverage rates at the state-year level of the four forms of 
insurance listed in Table IV.  I then regress these coverage rates on state and year 
effects plus two variables that measure the pre- and post-adoption trends for the 
states.  The pre-adoption trend is constructed as a negative integer that indicates the 
number of years until an expanding state’s adoption and zero for non-adopting states 
or for years after a state adopted. The post-adoption trend variable is constructed as 
                                                          
March CPS.  Given that the NIS is an annual survey, this paper uses the March CPS to construct 
simulated eligibility in order to better align with the timeline of the NIS. 
16 The sample contains observations from all states and not just HCUP participating states to fully 
document no difference in the pre-trends for all reforming and non-reforming states. 
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a positive integer that indicates the number of years after an expanding state’s 
adoption and zero for non-adopting states or for years prior to a state’s adoption.17   
The regression results for the pre-treatment analysis are presented in Table 
IV.  I find no statistically significant difference in coverage rates between adopting 
and non-adopting states leading up to the expansions.  The pre-adoption trend 
coefficients in Table IV are near zero and statistically insignificant for all four types 
of insurance coverage implying little coverage differences between adopting and 
non-adopting states.  There is a statistically significant difference between Medicaid 
and private insurance rates post-adoption, however, and the coefficients on the post-
adoption trend variable indicate the presence of crowd-out.  States who adopted the 
expansions saw increases in their Medicaid rates and decreases in their private 
insurance rates relative to non-adopting states though the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not exactly equal.  Overall, the results in Table IV indicate the 
similarity of coverage rates trends prior to expansion and supports the validity of the 
instrument, but this is by no means a sufficient condition for no endogeneity. 
D. Charges versus Prices/Payments 
 The HCUP NIS contains the total charges for each discharge which is not 
necessarily equal to the actual payments the hospital received for the services it 
provided.  The terms prices and charges are often used interchangeably, but in 
general refer to two distinct variables.  Charges are usually understood to be the list 
price of a service provided at the hospital while prices usually refer to the actual 
payment that hospitals/providers received from the insurer (after rates have been 
negotiated).  It is widely believed that charges are irrelevant, marked-up versions of 
prices and are not informative of current hospital cost conditions or behavior.  
Several studies, however, have indicated that charges may not be completely 
irrelevant particularly in regards to the setting of Medicare reimbursement rates, price 
                                                          
17 I group all observations with a pre-trend value less than or equal to -9 into one category.  I also 
group all observations with a post-trend value greater than or equal to 9 into one category. 
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transparency, uninsured/out-of-network patients, and inpatient outlier provision 
patients (Cookson, 2003, Dobson et al., 2005, Christensen et al., 2013.).   
 Actual payments and prices would be preferred over charges when 
investigating effects on cost-shifting.  Data sets containing actual payments from all 
insurance types, over long periods of time, for multiple states, and at the patient 
level, however, are rare and expensive.  The question remains then as to how 
informative total charges are in regards to payments?  To evaluate this issue, I 
obtained the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters (CCE) database from 
Truven Health Analytics, Inc. for the years 2003 and 2004.  The CCE contains 
claims (actual payments) data from a selection of large employer-provided plans in 
the United States for various encounter environments (Inpatient, Outpatient, 
Pharmaceuticals, etc.).  Using the inpatient encounters data, we can compare charges 
in the HCUP NIS and the claims in the CCE and examine how informative one is of 
the other.   
First, I have to create comparable samples between the CCE and the NIS.  
In order to align the CCE with my study sample, I eliminate claims for patients who 
are not between the ages of 20 to 64 or who are female.  Since the CCE contains 
commercial claims, I restrict the HCUP NIS to only include patients covered by 
private insurance in the years 2003 and 2004.  Given that there is no direct link 
between the patients in the two datasets, I calculate the average total charges from 
the NIS and average total payments from the CCE for each state-year-DRG cell and 
then merge the two databases based on these three characteristics.  Merging based on 
state, year, and DRG ensures that we are making charge and payment comparisons 
for patients with similar geographic, time, and medical conditions.   
Figure III is a scatterplot of the matched charges and payments from the two 
datasets along with a 45 degree line.  As expected, the scatterplot demonstrates that 
charges are larger than actual payments.  In particular, the difference between the 
two measures is larger for higher levels of charges.  Though the relationship between 
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charges and payments is not one-for-one, the scatterplot does suggest that there is a 
fairly informative relationship between the two.  This relationship can be further 
evaluated using a regression analysis.  Estimates of a regression of the average 
payments on the average charges imply that for every dollar increase in average 
charges, average payments increases by 0.61 and 0.67 with and without state and year 
fixed effects, respectively.  A disadvantage to this analysis is that the CCE only 
includes individuals with employer-provided coverage from large firms while the 
HCUP NIS includes a general census of inpatient discharges in the United States.  
Thus, even though we match charges and payments based on three influential 
characteristics, it is likely that the general population from the NIS contains 
individuals who have less comprehensive private plans than those from the large 
employer-provided population of the CCE.    
E. Estimating Equations 
Given that the HCUP NIS contains millions of discharges, my analysis will 
collapse the HCUP NIS into cells based on hospital, time, insurance type, and 
various discharge characteristics.  Collapsing the data in this way will help to reduce 
the computational strain of the regression when I control for various fixed effects 
and calculate clustered standard errors.  In order for the identification strategy I am 
proposing to be valid, it must be the case that the first stage (a shift in insurance 
types) occurred in the HCUP NIS data as a result of the Medicaid expansions for the 
disabled.  To verify that such a shift did occur, I use the collapsed data to estimate 
the following equation:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖  (1) 
 
where h, t, and d represent the hospital, time, and discharge characteristics, 
respectively.  The superscript, i, represents the insurance type of the cell.  The 
dependent variable in this equation, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖 , is an indicator variable 
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that equals 1 if the insurance type of the cell is type i and 0 otherwise.  Using the 
constructed sample of discharges from the HCUP NIS, Equation (1) is estimated for 
four types of insurance coverage: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, and 
Uninsured/Charity.   
Hospital, time, and discharge characteristic fixed effects are given by 𝛿ℎ, 𝜏𝑡, 
and 𝛾𝑑, respectively.  Hospitals are identified using the hospital identification variable 
provided within the HCUP NIS.  Time fixed effects account for both the year and 
the quarter of the discharge.  Discharge characteristic fixed effects control for the 
primary diagnosis, race, age, and duration of stay of the patient. The primary 
diagnosis codes follow the International Classification of Diseases version 9 Clinical 
Modification (ICD-9-CM).   Race includes indicators for whether a patient is white, 
black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, or other.  Age is broken 
down into five categories: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 years old.  Duration 
of hospital stay is divided into 7 groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and 
30+ days.  The key variable of interest in Equation (1), 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, is simulated 
disabled Medicaid eligibility for hospital, h, in time, t,.  Since Medicaid expansions are 
determined by the state, I cluster the standard errors at the state level to allow for 
any arbitrary correlation.18,19  Regressions are weighted by the NIS discharge weight 
that have been aggregated to the hospital-time-discharge characteristic-insurance cell 
level. 
 Once the first stage is verified within the HCUP NIS, we can then proceed 
to investigate the effect of Medicaid crowd-out on the charge rates by insurance type. 
To do this I estimate Equation 2:   
                                                          
18 I have also run specifications where I cluster at the hospital level and the results are similar.  The 
structure of HCUP NIS is such that some hospitals are sampled for more than one year, but this is 
not the case for all years and all hospitals.  Since Medicaid eligibility is set at the state level, it is likely 
that the appropriate correlation we need to account for is within the state. 
19 I bootstrapped a few of my standard errors since I had only 30 clusters.  Given that the 
computational demand of the bootstrapping procedure is large, I only did this for a few regressions.  
The statistical significance of the results did not change greatly. 
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ln(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖  (2) 
 
The indices, fixed effects, and 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 are defined the same as they were for 
Equation 1.  The dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
𝑖 , is constructed by dividing 
the sum of the total charges by the total number of patients in each hospital-time-
discharge characteristic-insurance cell.  Equation 2 is then estimated separately for 
each of the four types of insurance.  
 
V. Results 
A. First Stage: Shifts in Patient Insurance Mix 
A crucial step in this study is to verify the results from Wagner (2015) by 
showing that estimates from Equation (1) imply complete crowd-out of private 
health coverage by the Medicaid expansions for the disabled.  Estimates of Equation 
(1) are presented in Table V.  The estimate of the coefficient on simulated eligibility 
in column 1 of Table V suggests that for a ten percentage point increase in simulated 
eligibility, there was a 3.48 percentage point decrease in the number of private 
discharges.  This estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The effect 
of simulated eligibility on Medicaid coverage (column 2 of Table V) is an increase of 
2.98 percentage points for a ten percentage point increase in simulated eligibility and 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These estimates suggest a crowd-out 
rate equal to 117 percent and is consistent with the results found in Wagner (2015) 
which estimated the rate of crowd-out to be between 110-111 percent using data 
from the SIPP.20  The shifting from private insurance to Medicaid coverage 
                                                          
20 The rate of crowd-out is constructed as the share of Medicaid take-up that is accounted for by 
private coverage reduction. 
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represents a total of $24,208,926 in lost charges from the study sample of working 
aged disabled men.21 
The estimated effects on Medicare and Uninsured/Charity coverage are 
considerably smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant implying that there 
was little change to the overall rate of insurance.  The estimates in Table V confirm 
the existence of a shift from private to Medicaid coverage that generates a revenue 
loss to hospitals holding patient mix constant. 
B. Effects on the Average Charge Rate 
Given the verification of the first-stage, we can now use simulated eligibility 
to estimate an effect of the revenue reduction resulting from the private to Medicaid 
coverage shift on the average charge rate for patients in the HCUP NIS.  Estimates 
of Equation 2 are presented in Table VI for each type of insurance coverage.  For 
privately covered patients, a 1 percentage point increase in simulated Medicaid 
eligibility resulted in a reduction of the average charge rate by 1.2 percent (column 1 
of Table VI) which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Using the average 
charges for private patients and the average change in simulated eligibility, this 
estimate suggests an average decrease of $1,100 or 4 percent per private discharge. 
The effect on the average charge rate for Medicaid patients (column 2 of 
Table VI) was virtually zero, suggesting a statistically insignificant 0.08 percent 
reduction in the charge rate for a 1 percentage point increase in simulated eligibility.  
No change in the average Medicaid charge rate is expected since hospitals have no 
price setting power in the Medicaid market where reimbursement is determined by 
the state government.  The estimated effects on the charge rates for the two 
remaining insurance types are statistically insignificant though the estimates of their 
coefficients are not as close to zero as the coefficient for Medicaid.  These results are 
                                                          
21 On average simulated eligibility increases by 3.3 percentage points, suggesting a 1 percentage point 
(9,233 individuals in the study sample) increase in Medicaid patients in the inpatient setting.  The 
average difference in charges between private patients and Medicaid patients is equal to $2,622 
resulting in lost charges from crowd-out in the sample equal to 9,233*$2,622=24,208,926. 
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consistent with the predictions of the mixed economy model from Figure II and at 
the very least imply that hospitals do not employ cost-shifting strategies in response 
to the disabled Medicaid expansions.  Instead, hospitals reduce charges for private 
patients while average charges for all other insurance types do not significantly 
change.   
C. Results for Men with No Chronic Conditions 
The Medicaid expansions only increased eligibility for individuals who had a 
disability.  Since the HCUP NIS did not contain any direct data on whether a patient 
was disabled or not, I defined disability to be represented by the presence of a 
chronic condition on a patient’s diagnosis record.  We may be concerned, however, 
that this may not be an appropriate proxy for disability.  One way to examine the 
validity of this definition is by looking at individuals who have no chronic conditions 
on their record.  These individuals, by my definition, are not disabled and should 
therefore not experience a change in insurance coverage. Table VII presents first 
stage results for a sample of working age men who had no chronic diseases on their 
discharge record.  As expected, there is no statistically significant change in any type 
of insurance coverage for this particular group and importantly the coefficient for 
Medicaid coverage is near zero.  Though not explored in this paper, it is possible that 
there is a spillover effect on the average charge rate for non-chronic men.  As a 
response to the decline in payments from the disabled group, hospitals may have 
tried to alter pricing strategies for the non-disabled group as well.  This will be 
explored in future work. 
D. Average Charges Per Day Results 
The charge rate for the analysis in Table VI is constructed as the average 
total charges per discharge by insurance type.  Though the results in Table VI 
control for duration of stay fixed effects, we may also be interested in the effect on 
average total charges per day spent in the hospital. Table VIII presents estimates of 
Equation 2 where the dependent variable is the log of average charges per day spent 
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in the hospital.  Regressions in Table VIII do not control for duration of stay fixed 
effects since this is accounted for in the denominator of the independent variable.  
The effect on the charge rate per day for private patients in Table VIII, column 1 
indicates a reduction of about 1 percent for a 1 percentage point increase in 
simulated eligibility.  This represents a decrease of about 79 dollars per day and is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  Given that the average hospital stay 
was 5.2 days long, this translates into about $1,373 per privately insured patient 
which is consistent with the estimated effect from Table VI.  The effects on the 
charge rates per day for the three remaining insurance types were all statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 
E. Varying the Number of Diagnoses in the Study Sample 
The main analysis restricts the sample to the top 100 primary diagnoses 
among working age men with at least one chronic condition.  We may be concerned, 
however, that this restriction is too selective and that the results presented in Table V 
and Table VI will vary with the number of diagnoses included in the sample.  Table 
IX addresses these concerns.  Panel A of Table IX presents estimates of Equation 1 
and Equation 2 where the sample is restricted to the top 50 primary diagnoses 
among men with at least one chronic condition.  Panel B of Table IX repeats the 
same analysis with the top 500 primary diagnoses.   
The results in Panels A and B are virtually the same as in the main analysis 
with the top 100 diagnoses.  The rate of crowd-out is 112 percent for the top 50 
diagnoses and 105 percent for the top 500 diagnoses.  The reduction in the average 
private charge rate is 1.3 percent and 1.1 percent per 1 percentage point increase in 
simulated eligibility for the 50 and 500 diagnoses samples respectively.  Using the 
average change in simulated eligibility, this translates into reductions of $1,201 and 
$1,033 for private insured patients from the top 50 and 500 diagnoses, respectively.  
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These results are consistent with estimates from the top 100 diagnoses sample and 
alleviates the concern that reduction in the private charge rate is limited to a specific 
subsample of diagnoses among disabled men. 
F. Duration of Stay 
In response to the expansions, hospitals could alter the quantity of medical 
services provided to a patient.  One measure of quantity is the amount of medical 
time given to a patient.  There is some evidence that this may be affected following 
Medicaid expansions.  Garthwaite (2012) found that following the implementation of 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) expansions, pediatricians 
spent on average less time per appointment with Medicaid/SCHIP patients.  The 
HCUP NIS does not provide information on how much time a patient spends with a 
physician, but it does contain the number of days of the hospital stay.   
Panel A of Table X presents regression estimates for the effect of simulated 
Medicaid eligibility on average days spent in the hospital.  The dependent variable in 
the regressions is the total number of hospital days aggregated to the cell level and 
then divided by the total number of patients for the cell. Only uninsured/charity care 
patients experience statistically significant changes in the time spent in the hospital. 
The estimates suggest that for a 1 percentage point increase simulated eligibility time 
spent in the hospital decreased by 5, respectively for uninsured and charity care 
patients. This result is very large suggesting nearly a 100 percent decrease. 
Panel B of Table X performs a similar analysis as Panel A, but with the log of 
the average number of hospital days. In Panel B, the effect on uninsured/charity-
care patients is no longer statistically significant with a coefficient that suggests a still 
large, but more reasonable 44 percent reduction in days spent in the hospital.  The 
results in Table X suggest that privately insured, Medicaid, and Medicare patients did 
not experience a change in the amount of time they spent in the hospital suggesting a 
similar quantity of care provided after the expansions across the insurance types.  
The estimates are fairly noisy in both the level and log specifications, however, and 
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make it difficult to state conclusively that there is zero impact on days spent in the 
hospital.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Cost-shifting has been a major topic of discussion within the United States 
healthcare market ever since cost containment through reduced public 
reimbursements was first proposed several years ago.  Previous results (both 
theoretical and empirical) on cost-shifting have been mixed, but hospital and 
healthcare executives continue to claim that it is their main method of coping with 
low reimbursement rates from Medicaid or Medicare.  A report by Milliman in 2006 
estimated that the aggregate amount of cost-shifting (the gap between total Medicaid 
payments and private insurance payments) from Medicaid to Commercial patients 
was $16.2 billion for hospital care alone (Fox and Pickering 2008).22   
The development and implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act has reawakened the cost-shifting debate.  Given the large 
Medicaid expansions that are already underway in some states, many private 
consumers and insurance companies are speculating that increases in private out-of-
pocket medical expenses and insurance premiums from cost-shifting are inevitable.  
The Galen Institute argued that the expansion of Medicaid through the PPACA 
would result in a “hidden tax” on millions privately insured patients and lead to a 
vicious cycle in which more and more patients would drop private coverage because 
of its growing premiums (Turner and Roy 2013). 
The results of this paper would suggest the opposite, however.  Hospitals do 
not employ cost-shifting strategies in response to the Medicaid expansions for the 
disabled.  Instead, they actually reduce charges for private insured patients suggesting 
that the privately insured actually benefitted from the expansions in terms of charges.  
                                                          
22 Milliman is an independent consulting specializing in actuarial products, but the cost-shifting study 
cited here was requested by America’s Health Insurance Plans, the American Hospital Association, 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, and Premera Blue Cross. 
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Admittedly, the Medicaid expansions for the disabled were unique and the results 
may not generalize to the broader populations affected by the PPACA Medicaid 
expansions.  At the very least, however, these results suggest that cost-shifting is not 
the hospital’s only method of dealing with lower revenues as healthcare executives 
often claim. 
An important aspect not explored in this paper are the mechanisms by which 
the cost reduction occurs.  Do hospitals simply absorb these charge reductions and 
accept lower profit margins or do they cut costs in other ways?  One concern might 
be that the overall quality of care is reduced.  Preliminary results (not reported) 
suggest that mortality rates for the privately insured and uninsured/charity-care 
patients may be worsening, but further analysis is required.  There are several other 
quality measures of interest such as the likelihood of relapse/hospital re-admittance, 
length of recovery time, level of investment in new technology/equipment, or 
presence of post discharge complications (i.e. infections).  Unfortunately, the HCUP 
NIS does not have information on these quality measures so I leave this analysis for 
future work.   
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Table I: Summary Statistics for Working Age Men with At Least 
One Chronic Condition in HCUP NIS Sample 
Top 100 Primary Diagnosis Codes 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
   
Average Age 49 10.92 
% Black 0.19 0.39 
% Hispanic 0.09 0.29 
% Native American 0.004 0.06 
% Pacific Islander or Asian 0.01 0.12 
Average Real Charges $26,279 $42,209 
% Medicaid 0.19 0.39 
% Medicare 0.21 0.41 
% Private 0.49 0.50 
% Uninsured/Charity 0.12 0.32 
Average Length of Stay (Days) 5.21 7.53 
   
Observations (Discharges) 4,859,310  
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS.  Charges are in 2007 real dollars 
 
 
 
 
Table II: Top 5 Primary Diagnoses  
Working Age Men with one Chronic Condition in the HCUP NIS 1995-2007 
Diagnosis 
Code Description 
Number of 
Discharges (% of 
Sample Cases) 
41401 Coronary Atherosclerosis (Native Vessel) 513,107 (10.56%)  
4280 Congestive Heart Failure 223,573 (4.60%) 
78659 Chest Pain 182,198 (3.75%) 
486 Pneumonia 178,737 (3.68%) 
41071 Subendocardial Infarction 137,033 (2.82%) 
Notes: Diagnosis codes follow the ICD-9-CM strategy. 
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Table III: Medicaid Upper Income Threshold (UIT) and Simulated Eligibility  
for States in HCUP NIS 
First and Last Years in Sample 
  First Year Last Year (2007) 
State 
First Year in 
Sample 
UIT 
(% FPL) 
Simulated 
Eligibility 
UIT 
(% FPL) 
Simulated 
Eligibility 
AR 2004 80 0.43 80 0.43 
AZ 1995 74 0.40 100 0.50 
CA 1995 99 0.48 102 0.51 
CO 1995 83 0.41 77 0.41 
CT 1995 121 0.55 94 0.48 
FL 1995 90 0.44 88 0.46 
HI 1997 115 0.53 115 0.55 
IA 1995 74 0.37 74 0.40 
IN 2003 74 0.41 74 0.40 
KS 1995 74 0.37 74 0.40 
MA 1995 133 0.60 133 0.60 
MD 1995 74 0.37 74 0.40 
MI 2003 100 0.50 100 0.50 
MO 1995 71 0.36 85 0.45 
NC 2000 74 0.37 100 0.50 
NE 2005 100 0.50 100 0.50 
NH 2003 78 0.42 77 0.41 
NJ 1995 100 0.48 100 0.50 
NY 1995 88 0.43 84 0.45 
OK 2005 100 0.50 100 0.50 
PA 1995 100 0.48 100 0.50 
RI 2001 100 0.48 100 0.50 
SC 1995 100 0.48 100 0.50 
SD 2002 76 0.39 76 0.41 
TN 1997 74 0.38 74 0.40 
TX 2000 74 0.37 74 0.40 
UT 2002 100 0.49 100 0.50 
VA 1999 74 0.37 80 0.43 
VT 2001 100 0.48 80 0.43 
WY 2007 74 0.40 74 0.40 
Notes: The Upper Income Threshold (UIT) is the maximum amount of income as a 
percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) that an individual is allowed to have and still 
qualify for Medicaid coverage.  Simulated Eligibility is constructed as the share of a 
national sample that would be eligible for Medicaid if a state’s eligibility standards were 
imposed on the entire country.  UIT and Simulated Eligibility are reported for the first 
year a state enters the constructed sample and in 2007 (the last year of the study period). 
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Table IV: Pre and Post Trends in State Insurance Coverage Rates 
Work Disabled Sample 1992-2008 March CPS 
 Medicaid Private Medicare Uninsurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-Adoption Trend 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0008 
(0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Post-Adoption Trend 0.0048*** -0.0035* 0.0006 -0.0001 
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
     
Mean(Ins. Rate) 0.31 0.44 0.27 0.14 
Observations 867 867 867 867 
R-squared 0.7240 0.6766 0.6621 0.5885 
Notes: Results are from the 1992-2008 March CPS for work disabled individuals between the ages 
of 20 and 64. Regressions are OLS regressions of four types of state insurance coverage rates 
(Medicaid, Private, Medicare, and Uninsured) on a pre-adoption trend and a post-adoption trend. 
All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. * represents a 10% significance level, ** represents a 5% significance level, and *** represents 
a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SHADAC constructed weight for 
CPS health insurance coverage.  
 
 
Table V: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals from  
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men with At 
Least One Chronic Condition 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simulated Eligibility -0.348*** 0.298** -0.016 0.066 
 (0.092) (0.116) (0.048) (0.127) 
     
Mean(Payer Type) 0.49 0.19 0.21 0.11 
# of Cells 3,672,037 3,672,037 3,672,037 3,672,037 
R-squared 0.2670 0.1981 0.1222 0.1314 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least 
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  The dependent variables are indicator variables for 
four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  All 
regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration 
of Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents 
a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 
1 percent significance level.   
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Table VI: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charge Rate by Insurance Type 
for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for 
Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simulated Eligibility -1.214** -0.076 -0.557 1.315 
 (0.554) (0.711) (0.439) (1.836) 
     
Mean(Payment Rate) $27,427 $24,805 $26,989 $21,224 
# of Cells 1,613,488 727,295 860,917 470,337 
R-squared 0.7563 0.7786 0.7435 0.7526 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least 
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  Regressions are for four insurance types: Private 
Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  The payment rate is constructed 
as the average charges per patient by insurance type.  All regressions control for Hospital, Year, 
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects. 
Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** 
represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.  The 
charge rate is constructed by dividing total aggregate charges by total discharges in a cell. 
 
 
 
 
Table VII: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals from  
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Working Age Men with No Chronic Diagnoses 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sim. Eligibility -0.239 0.049 -0.001 0.191 
 (0.143) (0.111) (0.028) (0.211) 
     
Mean(Payer Type) 0.63 0.10 0.04 0.22 
# of Cells 1,514,597 1,514,597 1,514,597 1,514,597 
R-squared 0.2277 0.1446 0.0623 0.2067 
Notes: Results are for working age men with no chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  The 
dependent variables are indicator variables for four insurance types: Private Insurance, 
Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  All regressions control for Hospital, Year, 
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects. 
Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** 
represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.   
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Table VIII: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charges per Day by Insurance 
Type for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for 
Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simulated Eligibility -0.993* -0.111 -0.389 1.438 
 (0.500) (0.651) (0.452) (1.804) 
     
Mean(Chg. Per Day) $7,930 $4,520 $5,380 $5,452 
# of Cells 1,384,078 616,184 736,596 435,811 
R-squared 0.7413 0.7287 0.7007 0.7051 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least 
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  Regressions are for four insurance types: Private 
Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  The payment rate is constructed 
as the average charges per patient by insurance type.  All regressions control for Hospital, Year, 
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, and Age Category Fixed Effects.  Regressions are weighted using the 
discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, 
and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.  The charge rate is constructed by dividing 
total aggregate charges by total days spent in the hospital in a cell. 
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Table IX: Effects on Insurance Type and Log(Charge Rate) for Hospitals from  
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 50 and 500 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men 
with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Top 50 Diagnosis Codes 
 I: Insurance Type 
Sim. Eligibility -0.328*** 0.294** -0.004 0.038 
 (0.091) (0.108) (0.055) (0.123) 
Mean(Payer Type) 0.49 0.19 0.21 0.11 
# of Cells 2,742,211 2,742,211 2,742,211 2,742,211 
R-squared 0.2717 0.1979 0.1237 0.1229 
 II: Log(Charge Rate) 
Sim. Eligibility -1.306** -0.112 -0.565 1.471 
 (0.601) (0.727) (0.470) (1.913) 
Mean (Pay Rate) $28,006 $25,601 $27,436 $22,395 
# of Cells 1,167,824 557,078 672,758 344,551 
R-squared 0.7700 0.7842 0.7513 0.7630 
     
 Panel B: Top 500 Diagnosis Codes 
 I: Insurance Type 
Sim. Eligibility -0.308*** 0.292** -0.031 0.047 
 (0.083) (0.118) (0.039) (0.129) 
Mean(Payer Type) 0.49 0.19 0.21 0.11 
# of Cells 5,864,253 5,864,253 5,864,253 5,864,253 
R-squared 0.2539 0.1817 0.1182 0.1335 
 II: Log(Charge Rate) 
Sim. Eligibility -1.104** -0.111 -0.592 0.872 
 (0.516) (0.677) (0.432) (1.665) 
Mean(Pay Rate) $28,485 $26,579 $28,301 $22,140 
# of Cells 2,670,563 1,113,161 1,364,157 716,372 
R-squared 0.7444 0.7766 0.7412 0.7506 
Notes: Results are for the top 50 (Panel A) and top 500 (Panel B) primary diagnosis codes for 
working age men with at least one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  The dependent 
variables in the Insurance Type Analyses (I) are indicator variables for four insurance types: 
Private, Medicaid, Medicare, and Self-pay/Charity.  The dependent variable for Log(Charge 
Rate) (II) is constructed as the log of the total aggregate charges divided by total discharges in a 
cell for a given insurance type. All regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, 
Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted 
using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance 
level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.   
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Table X: Effects on Duration of Hospital Stay by Insurance Type for Discharges  
from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men 
with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 Private Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity 
Dep. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Panel A: Average Length of Hospital Stay (Days) 
Sim. Eligibility 0.241 0.695 -0.381 -4.991** 
 (1.198) (2.315) (1.853) (2.309) 
     
R-squared 0.2427 0.1873 0.1774 0.1865 
     
 Panel B: Log Average Length of Hospital Stay (Days) 
Sim. Eligibility -0.124 0.112 -0.245 -0.442 
 (0.289) (0.324) (0.212) (0.429) 
     
R-squared 0.3783 0.3310 0.3135 0.2971 
     
Mean(Avg. Stay) 4.24 6.81 6.49 4.94 
# of Cells 1,412,671 626,482 749,167 435,811 
Notes: Author’s calculation from Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project’s (HCUP) 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) (1995-2007). Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis 
codes for working age men with at least one chronic conditions in the HCUP NIS. Regressions 
are for four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity-
care. Duration measures include the average days (Panel A) and the log of average days (Panel 
B) spent in the hospital for a cell. All regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, 
Diagnosis, Race, and Age fixed effects.  Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents 
a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 
1 percent significance level. 
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Figure I: Aggregate Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratio, 
by Insurance Type, 1992-2012 
 
Notes: Data sourced from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch Chartbook 2014, 
Table 4.  The figure includes a time series from 1992 to 2012 of aggregate total payments relative 
to the total costs required to treat private, Medicaid, and Medicare patients for US hospitals. 
Payments include Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share payments. 
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Figure II: Graphical Representation of the Mixed Economy Model 
 
 
Notes: In a mixed economy model, hospitals face two markets: a price setting market 
represented by downward sloping demands corresponding to marginal revenue curves MRP1 and 
later MRP2 and a government reimbursed market represented by a horizontal line at the public 
reimbursement rate Pm.  When crowd-out occurs in a Medicaid expansion, MRP1 rotates to 
MRP2 and the price for a hospital with marginal cost curve MC decreases from P1 to P2. 
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Figure III: Relationship between HCUP Charges and Market Scan Payments, 
 Top 100 DRG's with 45 Degree Line 
 
Notes: The figure compares MarketScan CCE Average Total Payments and HCUP NIS Average 
Total Charges for the years 2003 and 2004 for working age (20-64) men.  MarketScan CCE 
Average Total Payments are constructed as the total claims (in thousands of dollars) for a state, 
year, DRG cell divided by the total number of patients in the cell.  HCUP NIS Average Charges 
are constructed as the total charges for private patients only in a state, year, DRG cell divided by 
the total number of NIS private patients in that cell.  The data points for the two samples are 
then merged by state, year, and DRG classification. The solid black line is a 45 degree line.   
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